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On the Secrecy Performance Over N-Wave with
Diffuse Power Fading Channel
José David Vega Sánchez, D. P. Moya Osorio, F. Javier López-Martínez, Martha Cecilia Paredes, and
Luis Urquiza-Aguiar
Abstract—We investigate the effect of considering realistic
propagation conditions different from classical Rice and Rayleigh
fading on wireless physical layer security. Specifically, we study
how the superposition of a number of dominant specular waves
and diffusely propagating components impacts the achievable se-
crecy performance compared to conventional assumptions relying
on the central limit theorem. We derive analytical expressions for
the secrecy outage probability, which have similar complexity
to other alternatives in the literature derived for simpler fading
models. We provide very useful insights on the impact on physical
layer security of (i) the number; (ii) the relative amplitudes and
(iii) the overall power of the dominant specular components. We
show that it is possible to obtain remarkable improvements on the
system secrecy performance when: (a) the relative amplitudes of
the dominant specular components for the eavesdropper channel
are sufficiently large compared to those of the eavesdropper’s
channel eavesdropper, and (b) the power of Bob’s dominant
components is significantly larger than the power of the Eve’s
dominant components.
Index Terms—generalized fading channels, mm-Wave, N-wave
with diffuse power fading model, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
HE fifth-generation (5G) of mobile networks aims to
raise the capacity and performance of communication
systems to unprecedented levels, including ultra-high data
rates, ultra-wide radio coverage, massive simultaneously con-
nected devices and ultra-low latencies. The new scenarios of
wireless systems under the umbrella of 5G include mm-Wave,
device-to-device, machine-type, and vehicular communica-
tions, among many others [1]. In particular, recent investiga-
tions have shown that none of the well-established fading mod-
els (e.g., Rayleigh, Rician and Nakagami-m) present accurate
fit with field measurements in mm-Wave communications [2].
One of the reasons for such mismatch relies in the fact
that classical fading models heavily rely on the central limit
theorem (CLT), which assumes a sufficiently large number
of multipath waves arriving at the receiver ends – and such
conditions are not always met [3].
In the last years, some efforts have been oriented to formu-
late more accurate channel models that overcome such limi-
José David Vega Sánchez, Martha Cecilia Paredes, and Luis Urquiza-
Aguiar are with the Departamento de Electrónica, Telecomunicaciones y
Redes de Información, Escuela Politécnica Nacional (EPN), Quito, 170525,
Ecuador. (e-mail: jose.vega01@epn.edu.ec; cecilia.paredes@epn.edu.ec;
luis.urquiza@epn.edu.ec)
D. P. Moya Osorio is with the Centre for Wireless Communications (CWC),
University of Oulu, Finland. (e-mail: diana.moyaosorio@oulu.fi)
F. Javier López-Martínez is with Departamento de Ingeniería de Comu-
nicaciones, Universidad de Málaga - Campus de Excelencia Internacional
Anadalucía Tech., Málaga 29071, Spain. (e-mail: fjlopezm@ic.uma.es).
tation. Among them, stochastic fading models that explicitly
discern between the individual multipath waves classically re-
garded as line-of-sight (LOS) components have been proposed
as a way for bridging the gap between CLT-based approaches
and purely ray-based models. Durgin’s two-wave with diffuse
power (TWDP) [4] and its generalization in [5] are known to
improve the fit to field measurements in different scenarios
including mm-Wave set-ups [2, 6], compared to conventional
small-scale fading models.
On the other hand, a myriad of challenges must still be
overcome so that 5G converges into a reliable, safe and
efficient system. One of the most critical aspects is related
to the security of information transmission, given that 5G is
designed to support rather diverse applications. As a conse-
quence, highly confidential and vulnerable data is expected
to be transmitted in future 5G and beyond networks, which
because of their wireless nature are sensitive to eavesdropping.
Regarding this, physical layer security (PLS) [7] emerges as a
promising solution to complement traditional security systems
by taking advantage of the random nature of wireless channels
to provide lightweight and efficient solutions for increasing the
security level in some applications [8, 9].
The physical layer security performance in wireless chan-
nels is a rather well-investigated topic in the literature. Never-
theless, because of the intricate nature of physically-motivated
wireless fading models, available results are restricted to some
special cases [10, 11] on which only two specular components
are considered. Very recently, it was suggested in [12] that the
inability to achieve perfect secrecy in wireless channels was
an artifact due to the consideration of the CLT assumption.
Hence, the impact of the number of multipath waves arriving
at the receiver ends, as well as their relative amplitudes, has
a dramatical effect on the secrecy performance. However, the
results in [12] considered only the limit case of a total absence
of diffuse fading, and the derivation of analytical expressions
for the secrecy performance metrics was not possible for a an
arbitrary number of waves.
In this paper, we investigate the PLS performance in a
wireless set-up, by assuming that the received signal is built
from the superposition of an arbitrary number N of dominant
multipath waves, plus some additional diffuse components –
this will be referred to as N-wave with diffuse power (NWDP)
fading, for which some formulations have been recently pro-
posed in order to deal with its rather unwieldy nature [13, 14].
Our goal is to perform a fine-grain characterization of the role
of individual multipath waves on the secrecy performance,
and to support our findings with analytical results. We derive
2exact expressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
for an arbitrary number of dominant waves at the desired
and eavesdropping ends, as well as simplified approximations
that become asymptotically tight in the high signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) regime. Some useful insights for improving the
secrecy performance in this scenario will be derived, which are
inherently linked to the underlying propagation mechanisms
and characteristics captured by the NWDP fading model. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• An exact closed-form expression for the SOP in terms
of well-know functions for the classical Wyner’s channel
model under NWDP fading.
• A high SNR approximation of the SOP is also derived,
which can be used straightforwardly in the context of
PLS. The merits of such expression are: (i) when γE is at
high SNR regime, it is highly tight to the exact SOP; (ii)
it notably reduces the computational effort concerning
the exact SOP. This fact helps to the wireless system
designers when requiring quick evaluation of security
risks.
• Some useful insights into the system are also provided
through the asymptotic analysis based on the exact ana-
lytical expression of the SOP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. System
and channel models are described in Section II. Section III
derives closed-form expressions for (i) the SOP; (ii) a high
SNR regime of the SOP; (iii) the asymptotic behaviour of the
SOP over NWDP fading channel. Section IV shows illustrative
numerical results and discussions. Finally, concluding remarks
are provided in Section V.
Notation: Throughout this paper, f(Z)(z) and F(Z)(z) de-
note the probability density function (PDF) and the cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable Z .
E [·] denotes expectation, Pr {·} denotes probability, and |·|
denotes the absolute value. In addition, Ln(·) denotes the
Laguerre polynomial [15, Eq. (22.2.13)], Γ(·) denotes the
gamma function [15, Eq. (6.1.1)]; γ(·, ·), the lower incomplete
gamma function [15, Eq. (6.5.2)]; 2F1 (·, ·; ·; ·), denotes the
hypergeometric function [15, Eq. (15.1.1)], and (·)(·) is the
Pochhammer symbol [15, Eq. (6.1.222)].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the classic Wyner’s wiretap channel as depicted
in Fig. 1, where a legitimate transmitter Alice (A) sends confi-
dential messages to the legitimate receiver Bob (B) through the
main channel, while the eavesdropper Eve (E) tries to intercept
these messages from its received signal over the eavesdropper
channel. It is assumed that the main and eavesdropper channels
experience independent quasi-static fading. Without loss of
generality, we assume that all nodes are equipped with a single
antenna.
We express the signal at each of the receiving ends as a
superposition of N multipath waves arising from dominant
specular reflections, and M additional waves associated to
diffuse scattering:
Rexp (jθ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi exp (jθi) +
M∑
k=1
Vk exp (jθk) (1)
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel consisting of a legitimate pair and one eavesdropper.
Because each diffuse scatterer is able to generate several
multipath waves [16], we can safely assume that M →∞ and
hence the diffuse component1 tends to be Gaussian distributed,
i.e.,
∑M
k=1 Vk exp (jθk) ≈ Vd exp (jθd), so that Vd is Rayleigh
distributed with E{|Vd|
2} = 2σ2 = Ω.
In (1), Vi exp(jθi) denotes the i-th specular component
having a constant amplitude Vi and a uniformly distributed
random phase θi ∼ U [0, 2π). The random phases for each
dominant wave are assumed to be statistically independent.
Let γ
∆
= γ0R
2 be the instantaneous received SNR through,
where γ0
∆
= PT/N0 is defined as the transmit SNR, with PT
being the transmit power and N0 being the mean power of
the additive white Gaussian noise. Note that γ can also be
redefined for the sake of convenience as γ = γ|h|2, where
h denotes any normalized fading channel, i.e., E{|h|2} = 1
and γ representing the average receive SNR. According to the
formulation in [13], the corresponding PDF and CDF of γ
over NWDP fading channel are:
fi(γi) =
1
γi
exp
(
−
γi
γi
) ∞∑
ni=0
CniLni
(
γi
γi
)
, (2a)
Fi(γi) =
∞∑
ni=0
Cni
ni∑
ki=0
(−1)ki
ki!
(
ni
ki
)
γ
(
ki + 1,
γi
γi
)
, (2b)
where i ∈ {B,E} represents either the main channel or the
eavesdropper channel, γi is the average receive SNR at B or
E as previously stated, i.e.,
γi = γ0E
[
R2i
]
r−ηii = γ0
(
Ni∑
n=0
V 2n,i +Ωi
)
r−ηii , (3)
where ηi is the path-loss exponent, and ri is the propagation
distance2. The Cni coefficient can be calculated recursively
by [13]
Cni =
ni∑
ki=0
(−ǫi)
ki
ki!
(
ni
ki
)
u
(2ki)
Ni+1
, (4)
1We note that the consideration of arbitrary N in (1) allows for individually
accounting for the effect of having multiple specular waves and largely differs
from the conventional assumptions in fading modeling, reducing only for
N = 0, 1, 2 to the Rayleigh, Rician and TWDP cases, respectively [4].
2Here, as in the LOS ball blockage model, we assume that ri lies within
a sphere of fixed radius RB. Interested readers can revise [18] for further
guidance about simplification of the LOS region as a fixed equivalent LOS
ball in mm-Wave cellular networks.
3where ǫi =
(
E
[
R2i
])
−1
, and
u2kij =
ki∑
m=0
(
ki
m
)2
u
(2m)
j−1 v
(2ki−2m)
j , for j = 2, . . . , Ni + 1,
(5)
where the initial value is u2ki1 = v
2ki
1 , and
v2kij =
{
V 2kij,i , for j = 1 . . .Ni,
(1)ki (Ωi)
ki , for j = Ni + 1.
(6)
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Exact SOP Analysis
We consider a passive eavesdropping scenario, so that Alice
has no channel state information (CSI) of Eve’s channel.
Hence, Alice’s only choice is to encode the confidential data
into codewords at a constant rate RS. This can occur in a
practical setup where Eve is silent during all transmissions.
According to [19], the secrecy capacity is obtained as
CS =max {CB − CE, 0}
=max {log2(1 + γB)− log2(1 + γE), 0} (7)
With these considerations, secrecy is achieved only in those
instants on which RS ≤ CS, and is compromised otherwise.
In this context, the SOP is defined as the probability that the
instantaneous secrecy capacity CS falls below a target secrecy
rate threshold RS, and can be expressed as [7]
SOP = Pr {CS (γB, γE) < RS}
= Pr
{(
1 + γB
1 + γE
)
< 2RS
∆
= τ
}
= Pr {γB < τγE + τ − 1}
=
∫
∞
0
FγB (τγE + τ − 1) fγE(γE)dγE. (8)
Furthermore, a high SNR approximation of the SOP can be
obtained from (8) as
SOPA = Pr {γB < τγE} ≤ SOP. (9)
Substituting (2) into (8) and (9), we can obtain the SOP and
the SOPA, respectively, over NWDP fading channels in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The SOP and the SOPA over NWDP fading
channels can be obtained as (10) and (11), respectively, at
the top of the next page.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. Notice that the derived analytical expressions
for both the SOP and SOPA are expressed in terms of infinite
series representations. This is also the case of the analysis in
[11] for TWDP based on the approximate PDF in [4], which
arises as a special case of our analysis.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
To get further insights about the role of the fading param-
eters in the system performance, the main concern in this
section is to derive asymptotic closed-form expressions to
investigate the behavior of the SOP given in (8) at high-SNR
regime. Here, we assume the following scenarios: (i) both γB
and γE go to infinity, while the ratio between these SNRs
is kept unchanged3; (ii) γB → ∞ while γE is kept fixed
4.
Our goal would be obtaining asymptotic expressions in the
form SOP∞ ≈ Gcγ
−Gd
B , where Gc and Gd represent the
secrecy array gain and the secrecy diversity gain, respectively.
However, as we will later see, such expressions will not be
of much practical use as in many cases, such asymptotic
does not kick in until very low probabilities are considered.
Hence, our asymptotic expressions will incorporate additional
terms on which the exponent of γB play a relevant role on
the SOP decay for practical operational values. Next, the
corresponding asymptotic expressions of the SOP over NWDP
fading channels are given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The asymptotic closed-form expressions of the SOP
over NWDP fading channels for the cases in that both γB →
∞, γE → ∞, and only γB → ∞ can be obtained as (12)
and (13), respectively, at the top of the next page.
Proof. See Appendix B.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we validate the accuracy of the proposed
expressions5. for some representative cases via Monte Carlo
simulations. We define a power ratio parameter similar to
the well-known Rician K parameter, e.g., KNi
∆
=
ΩNi
Ωi
, with
ΩNi =
∑Ni
n=0 V
2
n,i being the total average power of the
specular components. For the sake of comparison, the Rayleigh
case (i.e., NB = NE = 0) is included as a reference.
Before getting into the numerical examples, an important
remark is in order. Herein, we emphasize on providing clear
evidence to identify the impact of increasing/decreasing both
the number and the power of the dominant specular waves over
the secrecy performance. In other words, we aim to determine
to what extent it is worth that each of the individual specular
waves is treated separately, or it can be safely incorporated
into the diffuse component.
In Fig. 2, we compare the SOP as a function of γB for
different values of dominant specular components NB =
3This scenario corresponds to the case when both B and E are close to A.
4 This scenario corresponds to the case that A is very close to B and E is
located far way.
5Here, it is worth mentioning that depending on the value of the involved
channel parameters, these series require different number of terms to attain
an accurate approximation. In this context, the overall convergence speed of
these series is achieved faster for small values of both dominant rays (e.g,
NB, and NE) and power of Bob’s dominant specular components (i.e., K
B
dB
).
For instance, exhaustive tests have shown that the number of terms to arrive
at the desired accuracy (e.g., 10−6) varied from 20 to 30 at Bob and from
4 to 10 at Eve, and the average elapsed times to obtain the aforementioned
accuracy were ∼ 14.1, 27.5, 81.7, 103.5, 114.6 seconds for N = 1, . . . , 5,
respectively. Moreover, the mathematical representation of the derived series
consists of well-known elementary and special functions, which can be easily
implemented in software for numerical evaluation.
4SOP =1−
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(
nB
kB
)(
1
γE
) ∞∑
nE=0
CnE
kB∑
q=0
1
q!
(
1
γB
)q
exp
(
−
τ − 1
γB
) q∑
a=0
(
q
a
)
(τ − 1)
q−a
τa
×
(
1
γE
+
τ
γB
)
−1−a
Γ (1 + a) 2F1
(
1 + a,−nE; 1;
γB
γB + γEτ
)
(10)
SOPA =1−
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(
nB
kB
)(
1
γE
) ∞∑
nE=0
CnE
kB∑
q=0
1
q!
(
τ
γB
)q (
1
γE
+
τ
γB
)
−1−q
Γ (1 + q)
× 2F1
(
−nE, 1 + q; 1;
γB
γB + γEτ
)
(11)
SOP∞ ≈
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(kB + 1)!
(
nB
kB
)(
τ
γB
)kB+1 ∞∑
nE=0
CnE
nE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE!
(
nE
kE
)(
1
γE
)kE+1 n∑
i=1
wi exp (li) l
kB+kE+1
i
(12)
SOP∞ ≈
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(kB + 1)!
(
nB
kB
)(
τγE
γB
)kB+1 ∞∑
nE=0
CnE
Γ (kB + 2)Γ (nE + 1)
nE!
2F1 (−nE, kB + 2; 1; γE) (13)
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Fig. 2. SOP vs. γB, for different numbers of dominant specular waves N by
considering balanced amplitude scenario (i.e., Vn,i = 1 for n = 1, . . . ,Ni).
For all curves, the parameter values are: RS = 1 bps/Hz, γE = 4 dB, K
E
dB
=
10 dB, Ωi = 1, and Ni = N for i ∈ {B,E}. Dashed lines correspond to
asymptotic analysis by using expression (12).
NE = N, by considering the case of balanced amplitudes,
i.e., Vn,B = Vn,E ∀B, n = 1 . . .N. For this scenario,
the corresponding fading parameters are given by: KBdB =
10 log10 (KB = KNB) ∈ {8, 25} dBs with K
E
dB = 0 dB, RS
= 1 bps/Hz, and γE = 1 dB. Note that in all instances, Monte
Carlo simulations perfectly match with our derived results.
We see that the secrecy performance does not monotonically
increase with the number of specular components; instead, we
see that the cases with NB = 1 and NB = 2 bound the secrecy
performance when the rest of parameters are fixed. This is in
coherence with the fact that for an even number of dominant
specular components of equal amplitudes, the probability of
total cancellation between them is larger than when an odd
number is considered [17]. This increases fading severity for
the desired link more relevantly for large K , which ultimately
degrades the SOP. We also see that for N = 4, the performance
is very similar than in the Rayleigh case (i.e., N→∞).
In Fig. 3, we now evaluate the SOP vs. γB for different
numbers of dominant specular components NB = NE = N by
considering an unbalanced amplitudes scenario. For simplicity,
yet without loss of generality, the amplitudes of successive
rays are expressed in terms of the amplitude of the first dom-
inant component, as proposed in [12], that is, Vn,i = αn,iV1,i
for n = 2, . . . ,Ni, with 0 < αn,i < 1 and i ∈ {B,E}.
Considering this, we set: αn,i = αB = αE = 0.3 with
KBdB ∈ {8, 25} dBs, K
E
dB = 0 dB, RS = 1 bps/Hz, and
γE = 1 dB. Here, we investigate the impact of increasing
both the number and the power of Bob’s dominant rays for
the case of unbalanced amplitudes. We observe in all traces
that, unlike on the balanced counterpart, the SOP performance
now monotonically improves when rising KBdB or lowering N,
regardless of whether it is even or odd. It can be observed
that a reduced number of dominant specular components at
Bob is now beneficial from a secrecy perspective. We also
see that in all cases, the SOP performance is always better
than its Rayleigh counterpart. Regarding the asymptotic be-
haviour, it can be noticed that the asymptotic plots accurately
approximate the SOP curves at high SNR regime. Additionally,
all curves have different slopes. The reason for this will be
discussed later.
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Fig. 3. SOP in terms of γB for different numbers of dominant specular waves
N, by considering unbalanced amplitude case (i.e., αn,i = αi = 0.3). For
all cases, the corresponding parameters are set to the following values: RS =
1 bps/Hz, γE = 1 dB, K
E
dB
= 0 dB, Ωi = 1, and Ni = N for i ∈ {B,E}.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate both the SOP and the SOPA as a
function of γB, in order to understand the interplay between
the number of dominant specular components NB = NE = N,
the amplitude imbalance and the power of the dominant com-
ponents. We use a similar set of parameters as those in Fig. 3,
except for {αB, αE} = {0.2, 0.9}, {αB, αE} = {0.9, 0.2},
and γE = 8 dB. We now observe that the worst secrecy
performance is attained for cases where the imbalance for
the legitimate user αB is smaller than that of αE, i.e. when
αB > αE. Therefore, for the cases where αB is lower than
αE, we can obtain the desired secrecy performance (i.e., a
target SOP) for a lower average SNR at Bob. In such case,
some other interesting observations can be made: (i) the SOP
performance under NWDP fading is much better than in the
Rayleigh case, and (ii) the increase on the number of dominant
specular rays arriving at Bob is detrimental from a secrecy
perspective.
On the other hand, the worst SOP performances are
achieved for the case with (αB = 0.9, αE = 0.2), which is
explained as follows: because the amplitudes for the legitimate
link are balanced, this is translated into a more severe fading;
conversely, the unbalanced amplitudes for the eavesdropper’s
link indicate a lower fading severity compared to the Rayleigh
case. Combining the two effects, the overall SOP performance
is hence worse than when assuming Rayleigh fading for both
links.
Fig. 5 presents the evolution of the SOP as a function of
RS , considering the following channel settings: γE = 1 dB,
γB = 8 dB, K
B
dB = K
E
dB = 20 dB, and {αB, αE}={0.2, 0.3}.
Herein, we analyze the effect of having a different number of
dominant specular rays at both Bob and Eve over the secrecy
performance. We consider the cases NE = {2, 3} and NB =
{2, 3, 4, 5}, and for the sake of comparison, we also include
the case NB = NE. Once again we see that having a larger
number of multipath waves at the legitimate receiver in this
unbalanced scenario effectively increases channel variability,
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
PSfrag replacements
αB = 0.2, αE = 0.9
αB = 0.9, αE = 0.2
Fig. 4. SOP vs. γB for different numbers of dominant specular waves N
by considering unbalanced amplitude case (i.e., {αB, αE} = {0.2, 0.9} and
{αB, αE} = {0.9, 0.2}). For all curves, the values of channel parameters
are: RS = 1 bps/Hz, γE = 8 dB, K
B
dB
= KE
dB
= 25 dB Ωi = 1, and
Ni = N for i ∈ {B,E}
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Fig. 5. SOP in terms of RS for different numbers of dominant specular waves
of NB = {2, 3, 4, 5} with regard to NE = {2, 3} by considering unbalanced
amplitude case (i.e., {αB, αE} = {0.2, 0.3}). For all curves, we set: γE = 1
dB, γB = 8 dB, K
B
dB
= KE
dB
= 20 dB, and Ωi = 1 for i ∈ {B,E}.
which causes the SOP obtained when transmitting at a rate
RS to be increased with NB. We also see that for a fixed NB,
increasing the number of rays on the eavesdropper’s channel
is also detrimental for the SOP. This can be understood by
recalling that in the presence of a single dominant specular
component for each link and a strong LOS condition, the set-
up almost reduces to the AWGN case, for which the SOP is
zero as γB > γE. Hence, having a reduced number of rays
and a dominant component much larger than the remaining
specular waves turn out being beneficial for physical layer
security.
Next, Fig. 6 illustrates the SOP vs. γB for different numbers
of rays NB = NE = N with γE = 1 dB, K
B
dB = 25 dB, and
KEdB = 0 dB. Moreover, we set: RS = {1, 2.5} with α =
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Fig. 6. SOP vs. γB for different numbers of dominant specular waves N =
NB = NE by varying the value of RS and assuming unbalanced amplitudes
(i.e, α = {0.15, 0.30}). Also, γE = 1 dB, K
B
dB
= 25 dB, and KE
dB
= 0
dB.
αB,= αE = 0.15 and α = αB,= αE = 0.30 for N = 2, . . . 4,
and N = 5, respectively. From the figure can be observed that
both the relative amplitudes and the number of the dominant
waves play a pivotal role on the secrecy performance. For
instance, we see that the decay of the SOP is rather abrupt
for α = 0.15 and N = 1, . . . , 4 regardless of the choice of
RS = {1, 2.5}. However, when both the number of rays and
the relative amplitudes of the rays are slightly increased (say
α = 0.3 and N = 5), then the SOP is dramatically impaired
and the decay is now similar to the Rayleigh case. This is in
coherence with the observations made in [12] in the limit case
of the absence of diffuse scattering, as α (NB − 1) < 1.
Finally, in Fig. 7, we plot the SOP vs. γB and the two
asymptotic results (12), (13), respectively. In all the cases,
we employ equal numbers of rays at both B and E, i.e.,
N = NB = NE, RS = 1 bps/Hz, ΩB = ΩE = 1, and
γE = 8 dB. Also, yet without loss of generality, we assume
the following cases: Case I (N = 1): Balanced amplitudes,
V1,B = V1,E = 1, and K
B
dB = K
E
dB = 10 dB; Case
II (N = 2): Unbalanced amplitudes, V2,i = α2,iV1,i with
V1,i = 1 for i ∈ {B,E}, α2,B = 0.2, α2,E = 0.9, and
KBdB = K
E
dB = 15 dB; Case III (N = 3): Unbalanced
amplitudes, Vn,i = αn,iV1,i with V1,i = 1 for i ∈ {B,E},
αn,i = αB = αE = 0.3 for n = 2, 3., and K
B
dB = K
E
dB = 10
dB. Here, our primary aim is to analyze the secrecy diversity
order of the main links in the proposed scenarios. Firstly,
based on the asymptotic expressions (i.e., (12), and (13)),
we see that the exponents for the γB terms depend on one
of the summation indexes (i.e., (kB + 1)). This suggests that
each of these terms contributes in different ways to the decay
of the SOP, which explains that the slope of the SOP is
different depending on the range of values of γB. As the
SNR is increased, it is only the first term of the series which
contributes to the SOP, revealing a diversity order of one (vide
all cases in Fig. 7). However, we can see that such diversity
order is not useful for Case II, which justifies the need
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Fig. 7. SOP vs. γB for different numbers of dominant specular waves N =
NB = NE by assuming for all cases RS = 1 bps/Hz, ΩB = ΩE = 1, and
γE = 8 dB.
of the more accurate asymptotic expressions here provided,
compared to those only relying on Gd expression. Also, we
can observe that the asymptotic analytical in (12) is tighter
than the asymptotic one given in (13).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated how the explicit consideration of the inci-
dent waves arriving at the receiver ends may impact physical
layer security performance in the context of wireless fading
channels. The analytical results here presented complement
and generalize those previously reported in the literature, and
support the need of using ray-based fading models in those
situations on which a reduced number of multipath waves
are considered. The main takeaways of our work can be
summarized as: (i) abundant dominant specular rays impair
the SOP, so scenarios with a reduced number of rays arriving
at both Bob and Eve are beneficial whenever γB > γE ; (ii)
balanced amplitudes for the eavesdropper’s link and unbal-
anced amplitudes for the desired link are the most favorable
case from a PLS perspective; (iii) a significant increase on the
power of Bob’s dominant specular components with respect
to the power of Eve’s dominant specular components (i.e.,
KB >> KE), in the case of balanced amplitudes, is a worst
case scenario for secrecy performance.
7APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF LEMMA 1
A. SOP
Substituting (2) into (8), we can obtain
SOP =
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
kB!
(
nB
kB
)
1
γE
∞∑
nE=0
CnE︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
×
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
LnE
(
γE
γE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
× γ
(
kB + 1,
(τγE + τ − 1)
γB
)
dγE.︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
(14)
Using [20, Eq. (8.352.1)] into (14), I1 can be rewritten as
I1 =kB!
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
LnE
(
γE
γE
)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
− kB!
kB∑
q=0
1
q!
(
1
γB
)q ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
× LnE
(
γE
γE
)
exp
(
−
τγE + τ − 1
γB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
× (τγE + τ − 1)
q︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
dγE. (15)
Here, with the help of [20, Eq. (7.414.6)] the value of the
integral I2 can be γE when nE = 0 or zero otherwise (i.e.,
nE 6= 0). In the former case, after by performing some
algebraic manipulations, the first term of the SOP can be
simplified as C1kB!γE = 1. Next, by using [20, Eq. (1.111)],
I3 can be expressed as
I3 =
q∑
a=0
(
q
a
)
(τ − 1)
q−a
τa exp
(
−
τ − 1
γB
)∫
∞
0
LnE
(
γE
γE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
× γaE exp
(
−
γE
γE
−
τγE
γB
)
dγE.︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
(16)
Then, by solving the corresponding integral in I4, we get
I4 =
(
1
γE
+
τ
γB
)
−1−a
Γ (1 + a)
× 2F1
(
1 + a,−nE, 1,
γB
γB + γEτ
)
. (17)
Next, by combining (14) to (17), the SOP can be formulated
as in (10), which concludes the proof.
B. SOPA
Substituting (2) into (9), we get
SOPA =
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
kB!
(
nB
kB
)
1
γE
∞∑
nE=0
CnE︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
×
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
LnE
(
γE
γE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
× γ
(
kB + 1,
τγE
γB
)
dγE.︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
(18)
Again, by using [20, Eq. (8.352.1)] into (18), I5 can be
reformulated as
I5 =kB!
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
LnE
(
γE
γE
)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
− kB!
kB∑
q=0
1
q!
(
1
γB
)q
τq
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I6
× LnE
(
γE
γE
)
exp
(
−
τγE
γB
)
γqEdγE.︸ ︷︷ ︸
I6
(19)
Here, note that I5 is equivalent to I2. Therefore, the first
term of the SOPA (i.e., C1kB!γE) once again equals unity, as
discussed in the previous proof. On the other hand, by solving
the corresponding integral in I6, yields
I6 =
(
1
γE
+
τ
γB
)
−1−q
Γ (1 + q)
× 2F1
(
−nE, 1 + q, 1,
γB
γB + γEτ
)
. (20)
Finally, by combining (18) to (20), the SOPA is reached as
in (11), which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF LEMMA 2
A. SOP∞
1) Keeping γE Fixed and γB → ∞ : In order to approx-
imate (2b) as γB → ∞, we use the following relationship
γ (a, x) ≈ xs/s as x → 0. Therefore, (2b) can be asymptoti-
cally expressed by
FB(γB) ≈
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(kB + 1)!
(
nB
kB
)(
γB
γB
)kB+1
.
(21)
Substituting (21) together with (2a) into (9), it follows that
SOP∞ ≈
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(kB + 1)!
(
nB
kB
)(
1
γE
)(
τ
γB
)kB+1
×
∞∑
nE=0
CnE
∫
∞
0
γkB+1E exp
(
−
γE
γE
)
LnE
(
γE
γE
)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I7
(22)
8Next, with the aid of [20, Eq. (7.414.7)] to solve the integral
in I7, the asymptotic SOP can be expressed as in (13), which
concludes the proof.
2) Both γE → ∞, γB → ∞, and Fixed Ratio γE/γB:
From (21), the asymptotic PDF of E (i.e, γE →∞ ) is given
by
fE(γE) ≈
∞∑
nE=0
CnE
nE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE!
(
nE
kE
)(
1
γE
)kE+1
γkEE .
(23)
Substituting (21) and (23) into (9), we have
SOP∞ ≈
∞∑
nB=0
CnB
nB∑
kB=0
(−1)kB
(kB + 1)!
(
nB
kB
)(
τ
γB
)kB+1
×
∞∑
nE=0
CnE
nE∑
kE=0
(−1)kE
kE!
(
nE
kE
)(
1
γE
)kE+1
×
∫
∞
0
γkB+kE+1E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I8
. (24)
To solve I8, one can rewrite it as
I8 =
∫
∞
0
exp (−γE) f (γE) dγE, (25)
where f (γE) = exp (γE) γ
kB+kE+1
E . Now, according to the
Gauss-Laguerre quadrature method [15, Eq. (25.4.45)], I8 can
be closely approximated by a weighted sum as
I8 ≈
n∑
i=1
wif (li) , (26)
in which li is the ith zero of the Laguerre polynomial Ln(γE)
[15, Eq. (22.2.13)], and wi = li [(n+ 1)Ln+1 (li)]
−2
.6This
completes the proof.
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